Outmanned & Outgunned

Can Europe defend itself? John R. Deni on troop shortages, mismatched equipment, and the cost of security in a time of war. How well can Europe defend itself? John R. Deni on troop shortages, mismatched equipment, and the cost of security in a time of war. Brought to you by [Meco]( Recently at The Signal: Richard H. Pildes on the [risk of the U.S. presidential election actually being stolen](. … Today: John R. Deni on how well Europe can defend itself. … Also: Gustav Jönsson on the idea of “voluntary transfer” for Palestinian civilians in Gaza. [The Signal]( is your guide to democratic life, the trend lines shaping it, and the challenges confronting it. Join as a [member](—or become a [founding member](. This way comes Getty Images Since the end of World War II, Europe has relied on the United States for security. After Soviet communism collapsed in the 1990s, both the U.S. and its European NATO allies reduced defense spending—but not the allies’ fundamental dependence on American forces. When Russia invaded Ukraine’s Donbas region and annexed Crimea in 2014, NATO’s 32 member states agreed to raise their defense budgets to 2 percent of each country’s GDP. But in 2023, only 11 had met that target—and Washington was way out ahead of anyone else. Meanwhile, Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 delivered an [enormous shock to NATO’s system](. Germany’s Chancellor Olaf Scholz said the [invasion marked a historic turning point]( that forced his country to revisit its post-WWII aversion to building up military power. Now this year, 23 NATO members will hit that 2 percent spending target. Still, European militaries aren’t especially imposing. Ukraine has more than 500,000 active-duty troops, and it’s lost about 31,000 in the war. The U.K. and France have NATO’s biggest armies, but neither would be able even to mobilize 31,000 soldiers in a month. And military analysts have widely expressed serious doubts about the combat-readiness of European militaries and the quality of their equipment. Just how capable are Europe’s armies? John R. Deni is a research professor of joint interagency, intergovernmental, and multinational security studies at the U.S. Army College’s Strategic Studies Institute—and the author of [Coalition of the Unwilling and Unable: European Realignment and the Future of American Geopolitics](. Deni says that while European countries see Russia as a serious security threat today—and those closest to Russia see the threat most urgently—their efforts to transform their defense capabilities are running into complicated problems: They can’t attract enough new soldiers; some of their weapons don’t work; and sometimes their weapons just won’t work in other NATO countries’ systems. And yet, Deni says, the biggest challenge is money … [Read on]( Advertisement From John R. Deni at The Signal: - “Some European countries have almost completely emptied their supplies of some items. For instance, some have given Ukraine all their shoulder-fired air-defense systems, and some have given all their artillery systems. So there are real shortages of equipment now.” - “The British represent a good illustration of the issue. They built two new, state-of-the-art aircraft carriers, but they don’t have enough sailors for a carrier strike group. They rely on allies to fill the gaps—with ships, with aircraft, with personnel. The U.S. occasionally sends F-35 fighter jets to fly off these aircraft carriers. That’s a positive demonstration of what’s called interoperability—the ability for militaries to operate side-by-side—but also a demonstration of the U.K.’s lack of capacity to fill even their own defense systems.” - “You should be able to fire a shell made in one NATO country from an artillery system made in another NATO country, but it doesn’t always work that way. As the Ukrainians have found out on the battlefield, some of these shells have been customized by producer countries for specific artillery systems. There are a dozen variations of 155-mm ammunition—and that’s a problem.” [Read on]( Advertisement Tired of trying to read newsletters in the chaos of your inbox? [Learn more]( More than 50,000 readers have [decluttered with Meco](—on the web, iOs, or the brand-new Android app. NOTES Righteous Victims Levi Meir Clancy Over the last month, the Israeli Defense Force has been ordering Palestinian residents of northern Gaza—in Biet Hanoun, Beit Lahiya, and Jabalya—to move southward. The UN [estimates]( that the IDF has expelled some 60,000 from these neighborhoods, while some tens of thousands still remain. Meanwhile, in the last few weeks, Israel has tightly restricted the number of food trucks entering Gaza—with virtually none now reaching the North. The IDF has a straightforward explanation: It’s fighting Hamas in and around these neighborhoods. Others are implying more complex motives: Human-rights groups focused on the situation of Palestinians in northern Gaza are [alleging]( that Israel might now be starting to carry out some version of the so-called “Generals’ Plan”—published in September by the Israeli NGO [Forum of Commanders and Soldiers in the Reserves](—which calls for the hundreds of thousands of Palestinians who live north of the Netzarim Corridor to move south; for those who remain to be treated as combatants; and, in the words of the plan’s principal author, the retired IDF major general [Giora Eiland](, for forcing them to “[surrender or to starve](.” We can’t yet know the extent to which this vision informs the IDF’s strategy in northern Gaza, but it’s not obscure. This January, 11 Israeli cabinet members participated in a conference in support of resettling Gaza, where Israel’s minister of communications, Shlomo Karhi, endorsed “[encouraging voluntary emigration](” of Palestinians in Gaza. As one banner at the conference expressed the view, “Only a transfer will bring peace.” And last month, the minister of national security, Itamar Ben Gvir, [echoed the same language rather precisely](: “We will encourage the voluntary transfer of all Gazan citizens.” The history of the idea of “transferring” Palestinians is one of the subjects of the Israeli historian Benny Morris’s classic 2001 book, [Righteous Victims: A History of the Zionist-Arab Conflict, 1881-2001](. Morris chronicles the development of the idiom of “transfer” in the context of Israeli forces’ expulsion of Palestinians from their homes in 1948—and other expulsions since—largely as the implementation of policies formulated by Israeli leaders, not on the far right but on the liberal left. It’s a history Morris himself belongs to: He’s not a partisan of the Israeli right; he’s been opposed to it throughout his life; but he [takes the view]( now that it would’ve been for the best if Israel had fully expelled the Palestinians when it had the chance. —Gustav Jönsson [Read more notes]( [Join The Signal]( to unlock full conversations with hundreds of contributors and support our new, independent approach to current-affairs coverage. [Become a member]( Coming soon: Anton Jäger on Donald Trump in American history … This email address is unmonitored. Please send questions or comments [here](mailto:concierge@thesgnl.com). Interested in getting your teams or students access to The Signal? Please [be in touch](. Find us on [Linkedin]( and [X](. Add us to your [address book](mailto:updates@thesgnl.com). Unsubscribe [here](. © 2024 [unsubscribe](