Why elections come and go without major changes in American grand strategy. Why elections come and go without major changes in American grand strategy. Brought to you by [Incogni]( Recently at The Signal: Matthias Matthijs on [why so many European governments are becoming so weak]( . ⦠Today: Daniel Bessner on who actually runs U.S. foreign policy. ⦠Also: Michael Bluhm on the recent sham elections in Tunisia and the fate of the Arab Spring. ⦠&: Support The Signal and get access for life. Become a [founding member](. Subscribe to The Signal? Share with a friend. ⦠Sent to you? Sign up [here](. Entanglements Getty Images U.S. President Joe Biden spent more than 30 years on the Senate Foreign Relations Committee before becoming vice president in 2009. Bidenâs supporters cite his foreign-policy experience as one of his main strengths. In September of last year, he [said of himself](. âWhen Russia invaded Ukraine, I knew what to doâbecause Iâve been doing it for a long, long time.â The former U.S. ambassador to Russia Michael McFaul [struck a similar note](, praising Bidenâs foreign policy experience: âAmericans are lucky to have President Biden and his foreign-policy team in charge of national security right now.â But right now, even President Bidenâs closest colleagues concede that heâs not the man he once was. When he left the presidential race this summer, it was largely because he couldnât convince his fellow Democrats that he was up to it cognitively. But while heâs no longer running for president, he is still the president. Meaning Biden, who failed to reassure his own party that he could run a successful political campaign, is handling Americaâs engagement in two warsâeither of which might escalate suddenly and calamitously. Bidenâs national security team has tried to push back on such concerns. Secretary of State Antony Blinken [said he believes]( âthe president of the United States is doing a very good job.â And National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan [said](, âI am damn glad we have that guy sitting at the head of the table in the Situation Room.â But Blinken seems the public face of U.S. strategy in the Middle East; and Sullivan appears to be running major aspects of American strategy, more so than many previous National Security Advisorsânot least, for Americaâs Ukraine operations. According to [one former U.S. official](, Sullivan is âthe quartermaster of the warâand everything else.â So whoâs in charge of U.S. foreign policy? Daniel Bessner is an associate professor of American foreign policy at the University of Washington and the author of [Democracy in Exile: Hans Speier and the Rise of the Defense Intellectual](. By law, Bessner says, the president has near-total control over U.S. foreign policyâs vision and strategy; but in practice, that vision and strategy is shaped by the institutions charged with carrying it outâand since World War II, those institutions have been set up intentionally to insulate the American government from the American public ⦠[Read on]( The Signal is a new current-affairs brand for understanding democratic life, the trend lines shaping it, and the challenges confronting it. Learn [more](. And [join](âto be a valued member, support our growth, and have full access. Advertisement From Daniel Bessner at The Signal: - âThe U.S. Congress has very limited control over foreign policy. In America, only Congress can officially declare war; but it hasnât done that since June 1942âagainst Romania, Bulgaria, and Hungary. Essentially, the U.S. Congress has ceded its authority to the executive branchâand I donât mean to the State Department but specifically to the White House. Congress has had a very limited ability to shape foreign policy since the Second World War. There was a brief moment in the mid-1970s, in connection to the Vietnam War, when the congressional Church Committee investigated organizations like the Central Intelligence Agency and the National Security Agencyâand Congress passed the 1973 War Powers Act, requiring the president to get its consent before sending American troops into combat. But after that moment in the â70s, American foreign policy returned to postwar normalityâthat is, to the White House.â - âSince World War II, American elites have intentionally insulated foreign policy from the American public. Thatâs evident in the creation of an institutional bureaucracy that includes the National Security Council, the Central Intelligence Agency, the Department of Defense, the National Security Agency, and other organizations with next-to-no democratic accountability. American foreign policy hasnât been meaningfully democratic for a very long time. More broadly, Iâd say, the United States is best understood as a procedural democracy, where democracy is pretty much limited to voting. Thatâs not to say the U.S. isnât a democracy; it is. It has free and fair elections, so the public can decide which elite is going to govern them. That is not true in non-democracies. But in a U.S.-style procedural democracy, the public has little control over an area of concern like foreign policy.â - âDefense contractors shape U.S. foreign policy in a few ways. Partly thatâs through lobbying. But itâs largely through social relationships. Itâs by hanging out at the same bars. Itâs by generals retiring to serve on the boards of weapons manufacturers, then connecting with people in government. A government official living in D.C. or Northern Virginia might have an ex-mentor who is on the board of Lockheed Martin. They might have kids at the same school or have lunch at the same restaurant. All the normal ways in which human beings wield influence. People who go into foreign policy or defense contracting, meanwhile, often start with certain common ideological presumptions about what the international role of the United States should be. In particular, they tend to believe the U.S. should remain a superpowerâacross essentially every region of the world.â [Read on]( The world is complex, fast-changing, and uncertain. To navigate it effectively, you always have to start with good questions ⦠Thatâs what The Signal doesâand every answer leads us to more of them. Become a [member]( to unlock this full conversation and explore the archive. Advertisement Data brokers sell sensitive infoâphone number, DOB, SSNâwithout your consent. Best case: targeted ads. Worst case: scammers and identity thieves. What can you do? Incogni helps scrub your data from the web. Protect yourself today. [Learn more]( Get 55% off with code GET55. NOTES Night in Tunisia Mohamed Nohassi President Kais Saied was re-elected to a second five-year term in Tunisia on October 6. But the election was largely a sham: Saied won around 91 percent of the vote, but his main challenger had been jailed during the campaign and sentenced to 12 years in prison for allegedly falsifying election documents. The countryâs election authorityâunder Saiedâs controlâdisqualified more than a dozen other candidates. Officially, fewer than 28 percent of Tunisians even turned out to voteâthough the government refused to allow independent election observers to monitor the balloting, so who knows. Back in 2019, Saied was elected in free and fair elections, but in 2021 he dissolved Parliament and has ruled by decree since, turning Tunisia squarely into an autocracyâusing his powers to undermine the countryâs institutions, replacing judges and all regional governors with people loyal to him. Notably, Tunisia is where the anti-regime Arab Spring began in late 2010, after a fruit vendor in a small town immolated himself to protest his treatment by local officials. The revolution there ignited uprisings across the Arab world, eventually toppling dictators in Egypt, Libya, and Yemenâand sparking a civil war in Syria that continues today. Longtime tyrants later fell in Sudan and Algeria. But all these countries have variously gone back to autocratic rule. Why couldnât democracy take root in the Arab Middle East and North Africa? In September 2021, shortly after Saied disbanded Parliament and declared an indefinite state of emergency, Michele Dunne [explored the problems Arab countries faced after their dictators fell](. For Dunne, two key factors thwarted their hopes for transitions to democracy: Regional powers like Saudi Arabia and the U.A.E. quickly moved to undermine them, while the United States and other Western democracies largely stood by without giving them much help. âMichael Bluhm [Read more notes]( Join The Signal to unlock full conversations with hundreds of contributors, explore the archive, and support our independent current-affairs coverage. [Become a member]( Coming soon: Lucan Way on the growing alliance among the worldâs most powerful autocracies â¦
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