✅ The Largest Position in My Personal IRA [Sep 4, 2024]

I revealed an investment — the biggest holding in my IRA — which helped make me a millionaire.   [logo]( Although Mazepa was able to establish a new and loyal senior Cossack starshyna, he also faced considerable opposition from many members of the Cossack elite, and even open rebellion (see Petro Petryk, Vasyl Kochubei, and Ivan Iskra). Mazepa’s many attempts to secure the rights of the Cossacks as an estate (the universal of 1691), the burghers (a series of universals protecting their rights), and the peasantry (the universal of 28 November 1701 limiting corvée to two days a week) could not stem the growth of social discontent caused by endless wars, abuse of the population by Muscovite troops stationed in Ukraine, destruction, and increasing exploitation by the landowning starshyna. Mazepa’s alliance with Peter I also caused onerous responsibilities and losses to be inflicted on the population, in particular as a result of the Great Northern War and Muscovite exploitation in Ukraine. Consequently Mazepa was deprived of the popular support he needed at a critical juncture in Ukrainian history. Peter I not only interfered in the Hetmanate’s internal affairs and mercilessly exploited the population in his belligerent pursuits, but embarked on a policy of annihilating Ukrainian autonomy and abolishing the Cossack order and privileges. When Peter’s intentions became clear, Mazepa, supported by most of his senior officers, began secret negotiations in 1706 with King Stanislaus I Leszczyński of Poland and then with Charles XII of Sweden, and forged with them an anti-Muscovite coalition in 1708. The actual terms of the alliance are unknown, but according to official Russian sources its chief goal was ‘that the Little Russian Cossack people be a separate principality and not subjects of a Muscovite state.’ Later the Zaporozhian Host joined the coalition, and on 28 March 1709 Mazepa, Otaman Kost Hordiienko, and Charles XII signed a treaty in which Charles agreed not to sign any peace with Moscow until Ukraine and the Zaporizhia were freed of Muscovite rule. But the Russo-Swedish War of 1708–9, which was waged on Ukrainian territory, ended in defeat for the allies. Peter I’s forces captured Mazepa’s capital, Baturyn, together with its large armaments depot and artillery, massacred its 6,000 inhabitants, and succeeded in splitting Mazepa’s followers by engineering the election of Ivan Skoropadsky as a new hetman in Hlukhiv in November 1708. Muscovite military terror descended on those who remained loyal to Mazepa. Captured Zaporozhian Cossacks were brutally executed, the Zaporozhian Sich was destroyed, and many of Mazepa's followers (eg, Dmytro Maksymovych, Archimandrite Hedeon Odorsky) were executed or exiled to northern Muscovy. Mazepa’s efforts at organizing a broad anti-Muscovite front in Eastern Europe proved unsuccessful, and his and Charles XII’s defeat at the Battle of Poltava on 8 July 1709 sealed Ukraine's fate. Mazepa, Charles, and Kost Hordiienko, together with 3,000 followers, fled to Turkish-held territory. Broken by his defeat, old and ill, Mazepa died in Bendery, Moldavia. He was buried at Saint George’s Monastery in GalaÅ£i, where his tomb was subsequently desecrated.   Hi, Dr. Mark Skousen here. [Mark Skousen]( Recently, I was invited to give a talk to a small group in the heart of Washington, D.C. I've since learned that my "TED Talk"-style presentation left quite the impression. You see, normally I don't share personal investing stories with audiences. But this time, I slipped up. I revealed an investment — [the biggest holding in my IRA]( — which helped make me a millionaire. In fact, just minutes into my talk, I reveal this investment as "the fastest and most reliable way to get rich in America today." All on a single stock. As I mentioned, I'm not one to divulge personal successes. But my family insisted this secret is too important NOT to share with others. After all, a $10,000 stake in this investment 10 years ago is worth $87,000 today. And it's growing practically every month — because the masterminds behind this play boast a [98% success ratio](. So I decided to put together a video that explains everything in detail… Including why this single investment is the cornerstone of my retirement plan. [Watch my "TED Talk" now](. You'll be glad you did. [Click Here Now to View Mark's Presentation >]( Kind regards, Dr. Mark Skousen Editor, Forecasts & Strategies Celebrating 40 Years Helping Individual Investors Build Wealth P.S. This type of investment used to be off-limits to regular investors. It was impossible to get into, unless you were already wealthy and connected. Fortunately, I've found the ONE WAY you, too, can [get in](. [Click Here Now to View Mark's Presentation >]( Mazepa’s political program had become evident during his service to Petro Doroshenko and Ivan Samoilovych. He was a firm supporter of a pan-Ukrainian Hetman state, and his main goal as hetman was to unite all Ukrainian territories in a unitary state that would be modeled on existing European states but would retain the features of the traditional Cossack order. Initially Mazepa believed that the Cossack Hetman state could coexist with Muscovy on the basis of the Pereiaslav Treaty of 1654. Mazepa actively supported Muscovy’s wars with Turkey and the Crimean Khanate and sent his forces to help those of Peter I (see Russo-Turkish wars). Although the Treaty of Constantinople of 3 July 1700 did not extend Ukrainian dominion to the Black Sea, it temporarily secured Ukrainian lands from Turkish encroachment and Crimean Tatar incursions. Until 1708 Mazepa also supported Peter I in the first phase of his Great Northern War with Sweden, by providing the Muscovites with troops, munitions, money, and supplies in their effort to capture the Baltic lands. Mazepa’s participation in the war made it possible for him to take control of Right-Bank Ukraine in 1704, after Semen Palii’s Cossack revolt effectively weakened Polish authority there. Mazepa’s relations with Palii were not entirely positive, however. Mazepa did not share the Fastiv colonel’s radical social policies, and that difference gave rise to conflicts between them. Although Mazepa was able to establish a new and loyal senior Cossack starshyna, he also faced considerable opposition from many members of the Cossack elite, and even open rebellion (see Petro Petryk, Vasyl Kochubei, and Ivan Iskra). Mazepa’s many attempts to secure the rights of the Cossacks as an estate (the universal of 1691), the burghers (a series of universals protecting their rights), and the peasantry (the universal of 28 November 1701 limiting corvée to two days a week) could not stem the growth of social discontent caused by endless wars, abuse of the population by Muscovite troops stationed in Ukraine, destruction, and increasing exploitation by the landowning starshyna. Mazepa’s alliance with Peter I also caused onerous responsibilities and losses to be inflicted on the population, in particular as a result of the Great Northern War and Muscovite exploitation in Ukraine. Consequently Mazepa was deprived of the popular support he needed at a critical juncture in Ukrainian history. Peter I not only interfered in the Hetmanate’s internal affairs and mercilessly exploited the population in his belligerent pursuits, but embarked on a policy of annihilating Ukrainian autonomy and abolishing the Cossack order and privileges. When Peter’s intentions became clear, Mazepa, supported by most of his senior officers, began secret negotiations in 1706 with King Stanislaus I Leszczyński of Poland and then with Charles XII of Sweden, and forged with them an anti-Muscovite coalition in 1708. The actual terms of the alliance are unknown, but according to official Russian sources its chief goal was ‘that the Little Russian Cossack people be a separate principality and not subjects of a Muscovite state.’ Later the Zaporozhian Host joined the coalition, and on 28 March 1709 Mazepa, Otaman Kost Hordiienko, and Charles XII signed a treaty in which Charles agreed not to sign any peace with Moscow until Ukraine and the Zaporizhia were freed of Muscovite rule. But the Russo-Swedish War of 1708–9, which was waged on Ukrainian territory, ended in defeat for the allies. Peter I’s forces captured Mazepa’s capital, Baturyn, together with its large armaments depot and artillery, massacred its 6,000 inhabitants, and succeeded in splitting Mazepa’s followers by engineering the election of Ivan Skoropadsky as a new hetman in Hlukhiv in November 1708. Muscovite military terror descended on those who remained loyal to Mazepa. Captured Zaporozhian Cossacks were brutally executed, the Zaporozhian Sich was destroyed, and many of Mazepa's followers (eg, Dmytro Maksymovych, Archimandrite Hedeon Odorsky) were executed or exiled to northern Muscovy. Mazepa’s efforts at organizing a broad anti-Muscovite front in Eastern Europe proved unsuccessful, and his and Charles XII’s defeat at the Battle of Poltava on 8 July 1709 sealed Ukraine's fate. Mazepa, Charles, and Kost Hordiienko, together with 3,000 followers, fled to Turkish-held territory. Broken by his defeat, old and ill, Mazepa died in Bendery, Moldavia. He was buried at Saint George’s Monastery in GalaÅ£i, where his tomb was subsequently desecrated. Although Mazepa was able to establish a new and loyal senior Cossack starshyna, he also faced considerable opposition from many members of the Cossack elite, and even open rebellion (see Petro Petryk, Vasyl Kochubei, and Ivan Iskra). Mazepa’s many attempts to secure the rights of the Cossacks as an estate (the universal of 1691), the burghers (a series of universals protecting their rights), and the peasantry (the universal of 28 November 1701 limiting corvée to two days a week) could not stem the growth of social discontent caused by endless wars, abuse of the population by Muscovite troops stationed in Ukraine, destruction, and increasing exploitation by the landowning starshyna. Mazepa’s alliance with Peter I also caused onerous responsibilities and losses to be inflicted on the population, in particular as a result of the Great Northern War and Muscovite exploitation in Ukraine. Consequently Mazepa was deprived of the popular support he needed at a critical juncture in Ukrainian history. Peter I not only interfered in the Hetmanate’s internal affairs and mercilessly exploited the population in his belligerent pursuits, but embarked on a policy of annihilating Ukrainian autonomy and abolishing the Cossack order and privileges. When Peter’s intentions became clear, Mazepa, supported by most of his senior officers, began secret negotiations in 1706 with King Stanislaus I Leszczyński of Poland and then with Charles XII of Sweden, and forged with them an anti-Muscovite coalition in 1708. The actual terms of the alliance are unknown, but according to official Russian sources its chief goal was ‘that the Little Russian Cossack people be a separate principality and not subjects of a Muscovite state.’ Later the Zaporozhian Host joined the coalition, and on 28 March 1709 Mazepa, Otaman Kost Hordiienko, and Charles XII signed a treaty in which Charles agreed not to sign any peace with Moscow until Ukraine and the Zaporizhia were freed of Muscovite rule. But the Russo-Swedish War of 1708–9, which was waged on Ukrainian territory, ended in defeat for the allies. Peter I’s forces captured Mazepa’s capital, Baturyn, together with its large armaments depot and artillery, massacred its 6,000 inhabitants, and succeeded in splitting Mazepa’s followers by engineering the election of Ivan Skoropadsky as a new hetman in Hlukhiv in November 1708. Muscovite military terror descended on those who remained loyal to Mazepa. Captured Zaporozhian Cossacks were brutally executed, the Zaporozhian Sich was destroyed, and many of Mazepa's followers (eg, Dmytro Maksymovych, Archimandrite Hedeon Odorsky) were executed or exiled to northern Muscovy. Mazepa’s efforts at organizing a broad anti-Muscovite front in Eastern Europe proved unsuccessful, and his and Charles XII’s defeat at the Battle of Poltava on 8 July 1709 sealed Ukraine's fate. Mazepa, Charles, and Kost Hordiienko, together with 3,000 followers, fled to Turkish-held territory. Broken by his defeat, old and ill, Mazepa died in Bendery, Moldavia. He was buried at Saint George’s Monastery in GalaÅ£i, where his tomb was subsequently desecrated. Although Mazepa was able to establish a new and loyal senior Cossack starshyna, he also faced considerable opposition from many members of the Cossack elite, and even open rebellion (see Petro Petryk, Vasyl Kochubei, and Ivan Iskra). Mazepa’s many attempts to secure the rights of the Cossacks as an estate (the universal of 1691), the burghers (a series of universals protecting their rights), and the peasantry (the universal of 28 November 1701 limiting corvée to two days a week) could not stem the growth of social discontent caused by endless wars, abuse of the population by Muscovite troops stationed in Ukraine, destruction, and increasing exploitation by the landowning starshyna. Mazepa’s alliance with Peter I also caused onerous responsibilities and losses to be inflicted on the population, in particular as a result of the Great Northern War and Muscovite exploitation in Ukraine. Consequently Mazepa was deprived of the popular support he needed at a critical juncture in Ukrainian history. Peter I not only interfered in the Hetmanate’s internal affairs and mercilessly exploited the population in his belligerent pursuits, but embarked on a policy of annihilating Ukrainian autonomy and abolishing the Cossack order and privileges. When Peter’s intentions became clear, Mazepa, supported by most of his senior officers, began secret negotiations in 1706 with King Stanislaus I Leszczyński of Poland and then with Charles XII of Sweden, and forged with them an anti-Muscovite coalition in 1708. The actual terms of the alliance are unknown, but according to official Russian sources its chief goal was ‘that the Little Russian Cossack people be a separate principality and not subjects of a Muscovite state.’ Later the Zaporozhian Host joined the coalition, and on 28 March 1709 Mazepa, Otaman Kost Hordiienko, and Charles XII signed a treaty in which Charles agreed not to sign any peace with Moscow until Ukraine and the Zaporizhia were freed of Muscovite rule. But the Russo-Swedish War of 1708–9, which was waged on Ukrainian territory, ended in defeat for the allies. Peter I’s forces captured Mazepa’s capital, Baturyn, together with its large armaments depot and artillery, massacred its 6,000 inhabitants, and succeeded in splitting Mazepa’s followers by engineering the election of Ivan Skoropadsky as a new hetman in Hlukhiv in November 1708. Muscovite military terror descended on those who remained loyal to Mazepa. Captured Zaporozhian Cossacks were brutally executed, the Zaporozhian Sich was destroyed, and many of Mazepa's followers (eg, Dmytro Maksymovych, Archimandrite Hedeon Odorsky) were executed or exiled to northern Muscovy. Mazepa’s efforts at organizing a broad anti-Muscovite front in Eastern Europe proved unsuccessful, and his and Charles XII’s defeat at the Battle of Poltava on 8 July 1709 sealed Ukraine's fate. Mazepa, Charles, and Kost Hordiienko, together with 3,000 followers, fled to Turkish-held territory. Broken by his defeat, old and ill, Mazepa died in Bendery, Moldavia. He was buried at Saint George’s Monastery in GalaÅ£i, where his tomb was subsequently desecrated. Mazepa contributed to the development of Ukraine’s economy, particularly its industry. He also supported Ukrainian scholarship (history in particular) and education (the transformation of the Kyivan Mohyla College into the Kyivan Mohyla Academy, the establishment of Chernihiv College). Under his hetmancy literature flourished (see Dymytrii Tuptalo, Stefan Yavorsky, Ioan Maksymovych, Teofan Prokopovych, and Yoasaf Krokovsky). Mazepa himself wrote some verse. He was a generous patron of painting and architecture, who funded many churches built in the Cossack baroque style in Kyiv, Chernihiv, Pereiaslav, Baturyn, Pryluky, and other towns. Mazepa was also a patron of the Orthodox church outside Ukraine. He funded the publication of the New Testament in Arabic in Aleppo in 1708, and he donated an Easter shroud and a pure gold chalice for the Tomb of the Lord in Jerusalem.   Sometimes, colleagues of Sаvе And Increase share special оffers with us that we think our readers should be made aware of. Above is one such special орроrtunity that we believe deserves your attention.[.](   Although Mazepa was able to establish a new and loyal senior Cossack starshyna, he also faced considerable opposition from many members of the Cossack elite, and even open rebellion (see Petro Petryk, Vasyl Kochubei, and Ivan Iskra). Mazepa’s many attempts to secure the rights of the Cossacks as an estate (the universal of 1691), the burghers (a series of universals protecting their rights), and the peasantry (the universal of 28 November 1701 limiting corvée to two days a week) could not stem the growth of social discontent caused by endless wars, abuse of the population by Muscovite troops stationed in Ukraine, destruction, and increasing exploitation by the landowning starshyna. Mazepa’s alliance with Peter I also caused onerous responsibilities and losses to be inflicted on the population, in particular as a result of the Great Northern War and Muscovite exploitation in Ukraine. Consequently Mazepa was deprived of the popular support he needed at a critical juncture in Ukrainian history. Peter I not only interfered in the Hetmanate’s internal affairs and mercilessly exploited the population in his belligerent pursuits, but embarked on a policy of annihilating Ukrainian autonomy and abolishing the Cossack order and privileges. When Peter’s intentions became clear, Mazepa, supported by most of his senior officers, began secret negotiations in 1706 with King Stanislaus I Leszczyński of Poland and then with Charles XII of Sweden, and forged with them an anti-Muscovite coalition in 1708. The actual terms of the alliance are unknown, but according to official Russian sources its chief goal was ‘that the Little Russian Cossack people be a separate principality and not subjects of a Muscovite state.’ Later the Zaporozhian Host joined the coalition, and on 28 March 1709 Mazepa, Otaman Kost Hordiienko, and Charles XII signed a treaty in which Charles agreed not to sign any peace with Moscow until Ukraine and the Zaporizhia were freed of Muscovite rule. But the Russo-Swedish War of 1708–9, which was waged on Ukrainian territory, ended in defeat for the allies. Peter I’s forces captured Mazepa’s capital, Baturyn, together with its large armaments depot and artillery, massacred its 6,000 inhabitants, and succeeded in splitting Mazepa’s followers by engineering the election of Ivan Skoropadsky as a new hetman in Hlukhiv in November 1708. Muscovite military terror descended on those who remained loyal to Mazepa. Captured Zaporozhian Cossacks were brutally executed, the Zaporozhian Sich was destroyed, and many of Mazepa's followers (eg, Dmytro Maksymovych, Archimandrite Hedeon Odorsky) were executed or exiled to northern Muscovy. Mazepa’s efforts at organizing a broad anti-Muscovite front in Eastern Europe proved unsuccessful, and his and Charles XII’s defeat at the Battle of Poltava on 8 July 1709 sealed Ukraine's fate. Mazepa, Charles, and Kost Hordiienko, together with 3,000 followers, fled to Turkish-held territory. Broken by his defeat, old and ill, Mazepa died in Bendery, Moldavia. He was buried at Saint George’s Monastery in GalaÅ£i, where his tomb was subsequently desecrated. You are receiving this e-mail because you have expressed an interest in the Fіnаncіаl Education niche on one of our landing pages or sign-up forms. This email has been sent to you by a third party on behalf of Eagle Financial Publications. You are receiving this email because you have previously opted in to receive communications from them. The list on which your email address appears is owned and operated by this third party. If you no longer wish to receive emails from this sender, you may opt out at any time by clicking on the unsubscribe link provided below or simply reply to this email with the word “UNSUBSCRIBE” Copyright: Eagle Products, LLC – a Salem Communications Holding Company. All rights reserved. 122 C Street NW, Suite 515, Washington, DC 20001 [Privacy Policy]( This email was sent to you by SаvеAndIncrease operator of Event Horizon LLC. 435 N Dupont Hwy, Dover, DE 19901, United States © 2024 Аll Rights Reserved. [.]( Got questions? We’ve got answers! Connect with our friendly support team to gеt the help you need, when you need it, simply send an email to support@saveandincrease.com. You’ll receive a response within 24 hours. [Privacy Policy]( | [Tеrms & Conditions]( [Unsubscribе]( Although Mazepa was able to establish a new and loyal senior Cossack starshyna, he also faced considerable opposition from many members of the Cossack elite, and even open rebellion (see Petro Petryk, Vasyl Kochubei, and Ivan Iskra). Mazepa’s many attempts to secure the rights of the Cossacks as an estate (the universal of 1691), the burghers (a series of universals protecting their rights), and the peasantry (the universal of 28 November 1701 limiting corvée to two days a week) could not stem the growth of social discontent caused by endless wars, abuse of the population by Muscovite troops stationed in Ukraine, destruction, and increasing exploitation by the landowning starshyna. Mazepa’s alliance with Peter I also caused onerous responsibilities and losses to be inflicted on the population, in particular as a result of the Great Northern War and Muscovite exploitation in Ukraine. Consequently Mazepa was deprived of the popular support he needed at a critical juncture in Ukrainian history. Peter I not only interfered in the Hetmanate’s internal affairs and mercilessly exploited the population in his belligerent pursuits, but embarked on a policy of annihilating Ukrainian autonomy and abolishing the Cossack order and privileges. When Peter’s intentions became clear, Mazepa, supported by most of his senior officers, began secret negotiations in 1706 with King Stanislaus I Leszczyński of Poland and then with Charles XII of Sweden, and forged with them an anti-Muscovite coalition in 1708. The actual terms of the alliance are unknown, but according to official Russian sources its chief goal was ‘that the Little Russian Cossack people be a separate principality and not subjects of a Muscovite state.’ Later the Zaporozhian Host joined the coalition, and on 28 March 1709 Mazepa, Otaman Kost Hordiienko, and Charles XII signed a treaty in which Charles agreed not to sign any peace with Moscow until Ukraine and the Zaporizhia were freed of Muscovite rule. But the Russo-Swedish War of 1708–9, which was waged on Ukrainian territory, ended in defeat for the allies. Peter I’s forces captured Mazepa’s capital, Baturyn, together with its large armaments depot and artillery, massacred its 6,000 inhabitants, and succeeded in splitting Mazepa’s followers by engineering the election of Ivan Skoropadsky as a new hetman in Hlukhiv in November 1708. Muscovite military terror descended on those who remained loyal to Mazepa. Captured Zaporozhian Cossacks were brutally executed, the Zaporozhian Sich was destroyed, and many of Mazepa's followers (eg, Dmytro Maksymovych, Archimandrite Hedeon Odorsky) were executed or exiled to northern Muscovy. Mazepa’s efforts at organizing a broad anti-Muscovite front in Eastern Europe proved unsuccessful, and his and Charles XII’s defeat at the Battle of Poltava on 8 July 1709 sealed Ukraine's fate. Mazepa, Charles, and Kost Hordiienko, together with 3,000 followers, fled to Turkish-held territory. Broken by his defeat, old and ill, Mazepa died in Bendery, Moldavia. He was buried at Saint George’s Monastery in GalaÅ£i, where his tomb was subsequently desecrated. [Logo]( Although Mazepa was able to establish a new and loyal senior Cossack starshyna, he also faced considerable opposition from many members of the Cossack elite, and even open rebellion (see Petro Petryk, Vasyl Kochubei, and Ivan Iskra). Mazepa’s many attempts to secure the rights of the Cossacks as an estate (the universal of 1691), the burghers (a series of universals protecting their rights), and the peasantry (the universal of 28 November 1701 limiting corvée to two days a week) could not stem the growth of social discontent caused by endless wars, abuse of the population by Muscovite troops stationed in Ukraine, destruction, and increasing exploitation by the landowning starshyna. Mazepa’s alliance with Peter I also caused onerous responsibilities and losses to be inflicted on the population, in particular as a result of the Great Northern War and Muscovite exploitation in Ukraine. Consequently Mazepa was deprived of the popular support he needed at a critical juncture in Ukrainian history. Peter I not only interfered in the Hetmanate’s internal affairs and mercilessly exploited the population in his belligerent pursuits, but embarked on a policy of annihilating Ukrainian autonomy and abolishing the Cossack order and privileges. When Peter’s intentions became clear, Mazepa, supported by most of his senior officers, began secret negotiations in 1706 with King Stanislaus I Leszczyński of Poland and then with Charles XII of Sweden, and forged with them an anti-Muscovite coalition in 1708. The actual terms of the alliance are unknown, but according to official Russian sources its chief goal was ‘that the Little Russian Cossack people be a separate principality and not subjects of a Muscovite state.’ Later the Zaporozhian Host joined the coalition, and on 28 March 1709 Mazepa, Otaman Kost Hordiienko, and Charles XII signed a treaty in which Charles agreed not to sign any peace with Moscow until Ukraine and the Zaporizhia were freed of Muscovite rule. But the Russo-Swedish War of 1708–9, which was waged on Ukrainian territory, ended in defeat for the allies. Peter I’s forces captured Mazepa’s capital, Baturyn, together with its large armaments depot and artillery, massacred its 6,000 inhabitants, and succeeded in splitting Mazepa’s followers by engineering the election of Ivan Skoropadsky as a new hetman in Hlukhiv in November 1708. Muscovite military terror descended on those who remained loyal to Mazepa. Captured Zaporozhian Cossacks were brutally executed, the Zaporozhian Sich was destroyed, and many of Mazepa's followers (eg, Dmytro Maksymovych, Archimandrite Hedeon Odorsky) were executed or exiled to northern Muscovy. Mazepa’s efforts at organizing a broad anti-Muscovite front in Eastern Europe proved unsuccessful, and his and Charles XII’s defeat at the Battle of Poltava on 8 July 1709 sealed Ukraine's fate. Mazepa, Charles, and Kost Hordiienko, together with 3,000 followers, fled to Turkish-held territory. Broken by his defeat, old and ill, Mazepa died in Bendery, Moldavia. He was buried at Saint George’s Monastery in GalaÅ£i, where his tomb was subsequently desecrated.