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China, Russia, Iran, North Korea—Your monthly CRANK Call from the Center for the National Interest

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CRANK Call is a monthly review of developments involving cooperation among China, Russia, Iran, and

CRANK Call is a monthly review of developments involving cooperation among China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea. CRANK Call is a monthly review of developments involving cooperation, and at times contention, among China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea ([the CRANKs](. August Highlights Moscow’s Azerbaijan policy angers Iran Iranian Foreign Ministry officials have [expressed anger]( at Russia’s decision to support an Azerbaijani plan to build a transportation corridor to the country’s Nakhchivan exclave across Armenian territory, including by [summoning]( the Russian ambassador in Tehran to complain. Iran has long opposed the proposed route of the Zangazur Corridor, as it would require Armenia to cede a thin strip of land connecting Azerbaijan to Nakhichevan and thus would sever Iran’s land route to Armenia. Iranian foreign minister Abbas Aragchi [said on 5 September]( that “any threat…to territorial integrity of our neighbors or redrawing of boundaries is totally unacceptable and a red line for Iran.” Iran maintains friendly ties to Armenia. The dustup started on 19 August, when Russian foreign minister Sergei Lavrov [accused Armenia]( of “sabotaging” a Russian-sponsored agreement to facilitate transportation links between Azerbaijan and Nakhchivan. Though Armenia had accepted this idea as a component of the diplomatic understandings that ended the 2020 war between Armenia and Azerbaijan, officials in Yerevan have not formally agreed to cede territory for the project and left the details to future talks. Armenia has been tilting toward closer relations with Western powers, particularly France, since losing the 2020 war to Azerbaijan. Armenia had long seen Moscow as its protector—an arrangement that dates to the Russian Empire—but did not receive the help it sought when Azerbaijan attacked. Today, observers see Russia punishing Yerevan for this drift away from its past alignment with Moscow. Turkey strongly supports Azerbaijan’s goals for the Zangazur Corridor, which would facilitate direct road and rail links from Turkey through Nakhchivan and the Corridor to Azerbaijan proper. While Iran and Russia have been increasingly close in recent years, driven by the benefits of military cooperation and opposition to Western sanctions on both, this issue has stoked a lot of resentment in Tehran, as [evidenced by the reactions]( of prominent Iranian commentators referring to the Russian move as a “dagger” pointed at Iran in [social media posts](. Last year, Moscow similarly angered Iranian officials and commentators with its support for [international arbitration]( to resolve the status of the Abu Musa and Greater and Lesser Tunb islands in the Persian Gulf. Iran’s former Shah seized the islands by force in 1971, but Abu Dhabi maintains its claim to the territory, which sits astride the main shipping lanes coming out of the Strait of Hormuz. Iran supplies missiles to Russia Early August press reports cite European intelligence sources asserting that Russian military personnel were [in Iran for training]( to operate the Fath-360 short-range ballistic missile system. Observers interpreted this as a sign that Iran was close to delivering the systems to Russia. On 10 September, the U.S. Department of Defense [confirmed]( that Iran had begun deliveries to Russia, despite [Tehran’s denials](. The Fath-360 missile has a range of about 75 miles, which fills the gap between artillery rockets and longer-range ballistic missiles and thus helps Russia to conserve the longer-range missiles for strikes that require their use. The contract also reportedly included the Ababil system, a shorter-range ballistic missile. Russia likely finds the missiles attractive as Ukraine has recently improved its ability to intercept slower suicide drones and now reports an interception rate approaching 85% for the Shahed-136, another Iranian-supplied system. The U.S. and Europe appear likely to announce new sanctions on Iran in response to the delivery, but apart from tighter enforcement of sanctions targeting oil exports, these steps would likely have only marginal economic impact. Russia and Iran aim to facilitate Turkey-Syria normalization Russian foreign minister Sergei Lavrov said on 31 August that he [hoped]( to hold a senior-level quadrilateral meeting including Russia, Iran, Turkey, and Syria in the near future to pursue progress toward a normalization of relations between Damascus and Ankara. Turkey broke diplomatic relations with Syria in 2011, at the beginning of the civil war there, but officials in both Damascus and Ankara have recently expressed interest in negotiating normalization. While Syrian officials have insisted that Turkey acknowledge its sovereignty over all Syria’s territory, they have not insisted upon withdrawal of Turkish troops from zones which they jointly control with Syrian rebels as a precondition for talks. Russia and Iran are each trying to push the process forward; normalization would remove a significant irritant in their relations with Ankara at a time when each hopes to divide Turkey from its Western allies. North Korea files complaint about Chinese plans for radio transmitters North Korea has [lodged a complaint]( with the International Telecommunications Union (ITU) regarding Chinese government plans to set up new radio transmitters near China’s border with North Korea. Officials in Pyongyang argue that the new FM broadcast stations will interfere with state radio broadcasts in North Korea, and complain that China’s government did not consult North Korean officials in advance about their plans. Outside experts have observed that [overt disagreement]( with China is rare for North Korea, given the latter’s economic dependence, and could signal strained relations. Beijing has not welcomed the surge in North Korean economic and military ties with Russia since the beginning of the war in Ukraine and prefers to maintain North Korea’s dependency on China. Links Russian President Vladimir Putin urged Iran to urge restraint in any retaliation against Israel for the killing of Hamas leader Ismael Haniyeh, avoiding civilian casualties. ([Reuters]( Russia has begun delivering advanced air defense and radar equipment to Iran, according to Iranian officials. ([The Times of Israel]( Iran displayed its long-range Mohajer-10 drones at the Army 2024 International Military-Technical Forum in Moscow, after having denied Russia was using a similar Iranian-made drone in Ukraine. ([Reuters]( Ukraine filed war crimes charges against an Iranian Revolutionary Guard officer accused of aiding Russian attacks against Ukrainian civilians. ([Iran News Update]( A U.S.-sanctioned North Korean official attended the Army 2024 International Military-Technical Forum in Moscow. ([NK News]( North Korean state media condemned the 13 August incursion by Ukrainian forces into Russian territory near Kursk. ([Reuters]( North Korea has sent roughly 13,000 containers of munitions to Russia, with a sharp surge this summer, according to South Korean estimates. ([NK News]( Official data shows that the number of North Koreans and Russians traveling between the two countries rose sharply in the first half of 2024. ([NK News]( Russian utility engineers visited North Korea to discuss upgrading the country’s troubled electric grid. ([NK News]( Chinese Premier Li Quiang visited Moscow on 21 August for a long-established annual meeting with Russia on bilateral cooperation conducted at the head-of-government level. ([CNN]( North Korea is using warehouses in China for transshipment of goods marketed on the Internet to consumers in third countries, in a scheme to evade sanctions. ([NK News]( Russian companies have encountered increasing problems making payments to Chinese vendors in recent months due to increased compliance by Chinese banks with U.S. secondary sanctions, impacting mainly smaller Russian companies outside the energy or agricultural sectors. ([Moscow Times]( Recent Analysis [The Changing Role of the U.S. Dollar]( (Sam Boocker and David Wessel, Brookings Institution - describes how the CRANKs are using alternate payment systems to avoid dollars and Western banks) [Growing but Limited: Iranian Economic Relations with China]( (Tomer Fadlon and Raz Zimmt, Institute for National Security Studies/Tel Aviv University) CRANK Call Editor-in-Chief, Paul Saunders Editor, Greg Priddy (gpriddy@cftni.org) Image credit: Press Office, President of Azerbaijan (via Wikimedia Commons) [Twitter]( [LinkedIn]( [YouTube]( [Website]( Copyright © 2024 Center for the National Interest, All rights reserved. Our mailing address is: Center for the National Interest 1025 Connecticut Ave NW Ste 709Washington, DC 20036-5420 [Add us to your address book]( Want to change how you receive these emails? You can [update your preferences]( or [unsubscribe from this list](.

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